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THE NECESSITY OF DELIVERY
THE NECESSITY OF DELIVERY IN MAKING GIFTS
BY W. LEWIS ROBERTS*
In a recent decision' the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut has reaffirmed its doctrine as to the necessity
of delivery in making gifts which it had laid down in the
leading case of Candee v. Connecticut Savings Bank .2 It
there said:
"It is not necessary that there should be a manual de-
livery of the thing given; nor is there any. particular form
or mode in which the transfer must be made. The gift
may be perfected when the donor places in the hands
of the donee the means of obtaining possession of the
contemplated gift, accompanied with acts and declara-
tions clearly showing an intention to give and to divest
himself of all dominion over the property."
This is certainly a far different doctrine'as to gifts from
the law as it was set forth by Bracton, namely that there
could be no gift without tradition of the subject of the
gift.8 The landmark decision on the point is Irons v.
Smallpiece4 where a father made an oral gift of two colts
to his son. They were left in the father's possession until
his death six month's later. He had supplied them with
hay up to within four days of his death. His executor and
residuary legatee took possession and the son brouglt suit
against him. The court took the position that there had
been no delivery and consequently no gift had been made.
After reviewing the early cases on the law of gifts of
chattels, Lord Justice Fry in Cochrane v. Moore5 says that
on that law two exceptions have been grafted, one in the
case of deeds, and the other in that of contracts of sale
where the intention of the parties is that the property shall
pass before delivery. The authorities supporting the first
of these exceptions are too numerous to call for citations.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 Prendergast v. Drew, 130 Atl. 75 (Conn. 1925).
81 Conn. 372, 375, 71 Atl. 551, 552 (1908).
3 Vol. 1, p. 128.
42 B. & A. 651 (1819).
8 L. I. 25 2 B. D. 57 (1890).
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A promise under seal to give a chattel was good at law even
though delivery of the chattel itself had not been made,
and in such cases equity refused to interfere.
The next step in the law of gifts was the statutory aboli-
tion of the requirement of seals on private documents.
What was the effect of these statutes on gifts by deed?
Did they reduce sealed instruments to the level of unsealed
instruments and make delivery of possession the only meth-
od of completing a gift or did they raise unsealed instru-
ments to a par with sealed instruments and make it possible
to effect a gift by an unsealed writing? In the case of
releases Professor Williston has pointed out that in some
jurisdictions:
"Statutes have qualified the result (of abolishing
seals) by giving an unsealed release in writing the effect
which the common law gave to sealed writings only. The
courts of a few other States by judicial legislation have
given the effect of a sealed release to a written discharge
qr acknowledgment of receipt in full."6
The same result, namely; allowing an unsealed instru-
ment to take the place of a sealed, seems to have been
reached in many instances in the case of gifts. Consider
the case of in re Cohn's Wil 1 where a husband delivered to
his wife on her birthday a paper containing the following
recital:
"I give this day to my wife, Sara K. Cohn, as a pres-
ent for her birthday, 500 shares of American Sumatra
Tobacco Company common stock. Leopold Cohn."
At the time the husband owned 7,213 shares of this stock
in the name of A, Cohn and Company, and deposited in a
safe deposit box in New York. The firm of A. Cohn &
Company had been dissolved a month before the time of
the execution of this writing. The husband promised to
hand over the stock when he got possession. The Court
held that there was a valid gift inter vivos but rested its
decision on the ground that handing over the paper was a
symbolical delivery.
The same court in Hawkins v. Union Trust Company8
'WmusTo oN CoNTRACTS Vol III §1822.
176 N. Y. S. 225 (1919).
8 187 App. Div. 472, 175 N. Y. S. 694 (1919).
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held that there was a valid gift where the donor sent the
donee a letter informing him of the gift of a boat which
was at the time held in storage. Also in In re Stalden's Es-
tate9 it held a written order delivered by a decedent to a
donee, for money and a watch contained in the money belt
of the decedent was held sufficient to prove a gift of those
chattels.
In Pennsylvania the orphan's court held that where an
owner of shares of stock in a bank wrote to the president
of the bank expressing her intention of making a present
gift of one thousand dollars worth of this stock and order-
ing him to make out and transfer to the intended donee a
certificate for it, there was a good gift. The bank presi-
dent in this case accepted the order but wrote back to the
owner suggesting that a gift of a thousand dollars in money
be substituted for the gift of stock. The owner died be-
fore anything further was done. 10
The Nevada case of Goldworthy v. Johnson" is also in
point. The decedent owned some Liberty bonds which
were held for her by a banking corporation. Three days
prior to her death, while she was in expectation of im-
mediate death, she wrote, signed, and delivered an instru-
ment in which she declared it to be her wish that the plain-
tiff should have the bonds The court found a good gift
causa mortis but based its decision on the assumption that
the written declaration was a symbolical delivery of the
bonds.
The Colorado court passed upon the question in the case
of Humphrey v. Ogden.12 There the defendant's wife de-
livered to the defendant a bill of sale of all her personal
property. She died without having made a manual deliv-
ery of the personalty and the wife's administratrix sued the
husband. The court held that there had been a valid gift
to the husband.
This last case is the only one of those thus far cited that
seems to suggest that an unsealed writing is sufficient to
pass title to personal property without delivery of the prop-
O 194 N. Y. S. 349 (1922).
10 Estate of Carter, 35 LANCASTER LAW REV. 89 (Pa. 0. C.)
21 204 Pac. 505 (Nev. 1922).
32 63 Colo. 309, 125 Pee. 110 (1912).
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erty itself. In the other cases the courts have rather rested
their decisions on the ground that the delivery of the paper
was a symbolical delivery of the thing sought to be trans-
ferred. It is submitted that they might better have said
that statutes doing away with the necessity of seals had
raised unsealed instruments to the position formerly held by
sealed instruments and that it is now possible to make a gift
of a chattel by a writing not under seal.
While this theory will explain many of the recent deci-
sions that over-step the earlier rule that a gift of personal
property cannot be effected except by delivery of the chat-
tel or by an instrument under seal purporting to transfer
title;, there are many cases that it does not explain. It
seems worthwhile to review some of these holdings that
at first glance seem to have carried the idea of symbolical
delivery to the 'nth degree and are doubtless by many re-
garded as monstrosities in the law of gifts, if not as abso-
lutely wrong.
In the case of Stephenson's Adm'r v. King1" the Court of
Appears of Kentucky sustained a gift causa mortis where
the donor handed the donee a letter from the donor's
attorney describing a note and a bond which the attorney
held for the donor and which were the object of the gift.
There was also a delivery of a key to a desk containing
other property. The intention to make a gift was estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the court. To use its own words:
"The motive for making it is equally as well estab-
lished, and the delivery of the key of the desk, and the
actual delivery of the letter from King containing a full
description of the note and bonds held by the agent, the
only evidence the intestate had of his possession for her
use, is a sufficient delivery to make the gift complete.
No other delivery could have been made, and the arbi-
trary rule such as formerly existed with reference to the
delivery of choses in action, requiring an assignment and
delivery of the indentical thing in order to make such a
gift valid, having long since been abandoned, there is 4no
reason why the intention to give, with the actual delivery
of the written evidence of the right to the thing, although
in the possession of another, under the belief of the donor
that it perfects the gift, should not be held to constitute
a valid gift causa mortis."
12 81 Ky. 425, 50 Am. Rep. 178 (1888).
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The federal court in Castle v. Persons14 sustained an oral
gift of a debt as a gift causa mortis. There a father think-
ing that he was about to die, told his son to pay A's wife,
who was present at the time, the amount of the debt owed
to the father by the son. One judge held that there was a
gift causa mortis, another was of the opinion that there was
a good assignment of a chose in action and the third judge
dissented from the two opinions sustaining the gift. He
based his dissent on the proposition that there was nothing
capable of delivery.
In Waite v. Grubbe15 a father pointed out to his daugh-
ter the places on his farm where money was buried and
made a positive declaration of gift of the money to her.
She did not remove the money from the places where it was
buried until after her father's death. The court found that
there was a valid gift.
In Simmond v. Simmond's Adm' r 6. the person who had
custody of certain notes refused to surrender them to the
payee so that he could make a gift of them to the maker,
the defendant in the court below. The custodian later
surrendered the notes to the payee's administrator, who
brought suit on them. It was held that the gift to the de-
fendant was complete and a good defense. This is quite
contrary to the earlier view as set forth in Pirot v. Sander-
son'17 that delivery actual or constructive cannot be made
an owner where the property is held by a third party as
bailee or custodian, if the third party refuses to deliver
over to the donee.
The Indiana case of Teague v. Abbott 8 is Very similar to
the Oregon decision in Waite v. Grubbe. During dece-
dent's last illness his brother's minor step-daughter cared
for him. He intrusted her with the combination of his
safe in which was certain bank stock. He told her she
was to have them as her reward for taking care of him.
She did not take possession before his death and the bank
stock came into the possession of the decedent's adminis-
trator. The court held that the girl's knowledge of the
24 117 Fed. 835 (1902).
15 43 Ore. 498, 73 Pac. 206 (1903).
10 133 Ky. 493, 118 S. W. 304 (1909).
17 1 Den. 309 (N. C. 1827).
%a 61 Ind. App. 604, 100 N. E. 27 (1912).
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combination of the safe rendered manual delivery unnec-
essary and the transaction constituted a constructive deliv-
ery of the stock and as such made the girl absolute owner.
A case commentator in the Michigan Law Review,"0 in con-
sidering this decision, observes that the exceptions, if they
keep on growing, will soon constitute the rule.
Whatley v. Mitchell" presented substantially the same
facts as the pioneer case of Irons v. Smallpiece. A grand-
father gave a heifer to a grandchild who lived with him
and the Georgia Court upheld a verdict sustaining the gift
to the grandchild.
The Nebraska court held that there was a good gift in
the case of Dinslage v. Stratman21 where a creditor told his
debtor to pay the amount of the debt to a third person. The
court there quotes with approval from CYC as follows:
"Where the proof is clear of an intention to make an
absolute gift inter vivos of a chose in actfon, arising from
a debt not evidenced by a promissory note or other in-
strument, an unequivocal direction by the donor to the
debtor to pay the debt to the donee, instead of to the
creditor, is a sufficient delivery of the gift, it being the
only delivery of which the chose is susceptible."
One more case in point is that of Ogden v. Washington
National Bank.22 There the decedent, who was about to
undergo an operation, went to the bank with her mother
and told the cashier that she wished to give the $500 depos-
ited there to her mother and told them to fix it so that the
mother could check it at any time. The cashier took the
mother's signature. The same day the decedent handed
her mother a box containing among other things, the bank
book and told those present that she had given her mother
everything. The court held that there was sufficient evi-
dence tb estsblish a gift inter vivos of the $500.
An easy way to dispose of these cases would be to say
that they are contrary to the law of gifts as established by
the great weight of authority and that they are therefore
wrong. However, the writer respectfully submits that they
"2 VoL II, p. 410.
2 24 Ga. App. 174, 100 S. E. 229 (1919).
m 105 Neb. 274, 180 N. W. 81 (1920).
- 145 N. E. 514 (Ind. 1924).
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show the direction that the law on the subject is developing
and that it is only a question of time until the courts will
sustain gifts at least between the alleged donee and third
parties where there is noteven a semblance of symbolical
delivery but where they are satisfied that the alleged donor
intended to make a gift.
To sustain the view that courts are not going to require
delivery, either actual or symbolical, as against third par-
ties, one might refer to insurance cases, especially deci-
sions of the English courts, where intent of the maker that
the instrument shall be binding has been held sufficient
without actual delivery. The classic example, of course,
in Xenos v. WickhamW where the court used the following
language: "The mere affixing the sea] does not render it a
deed; but as soon as there are acts or words sufficient to
show that it is intended by the party to be executed as his
deed presently binding, on him, it is sufficient."
Then too, one might argue in support of this proposition
that in all probability the requisite of delivery in the case
of gifts was largely evidential. Today since the parties
themselves may generally be called as witnesses and many
other means of proof are possible that were not formerly
the courts if they are fully satisfied that there was a gift,
are not going to allow the ancient requirement of delivery
to stand in the way of their sustaining the gift.
In conclusion, we might refer to !he language of Mr.
Justice Holmes as sustaining this position. In considering
whether there was a good gift of a trade mark in the case
of Chadwick v. Covel124 he says:
"The old rule was 'Everything which is not given by
delivery of hands, must be passed by deed'. Noy, Max-
ims, 62 c. 33. Fairfax, J., in Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, 26 pl.
45. Shep. Touch. 229. But the formalities required by
the early common law have been broken in upon a good
deal, although more in England than in this State. It
may be that later forms of property not admitting of de-
livery, but unknown to the old law or not then the sub-
ject of transfer, are free from the restraint of the an-
= L. R. 2 H. L. 296 (1866).
24 161 Mass. 190, 23 N. E. 1068 (1890).
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cient irule; just as, at Rome, later forms of property
could be conveyed without the comparatively arclaic
ceremonies of mancipation. It may be that even an
oral gift of incorporeal personal property would be sus-
tained, although delivery is impossible from the nature
of the case. But that question we leave undecided."
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